INTRODUCTION
Web technology is moving forward at a rapid pace. Everyday new frameworks and APIs are pushed to production. This constant development also leads to a change in attack surface and vulnerabilities. In this process Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities have evolved signi cantly in the recent years. The traditional reected XSS issue is very di erent from modern DOM-based XSS vulnerabilities such as mXSS [12] , or expression-language-based XSS [10] . While the topic of XSS becomes increasingly more complex, many mitigation techniques only focus on the traditional and well-understood re ected XSS variant.
In this paper, we present a novel Web attack which demonstrates that many mitigation techniques are ine cient when confronted with modern JavaScript libraries. At the core of the presented attack are so-called script gadgets, small fragments of JavaScript contained in the vulnerable site's legitimate code. Generally speaking, a script gadget is piece of JavaScript code which reacts to the presence of speci cally formed DOM content in the Web document. In a gadget-based attack, the adversary injects apparently harmless HTML markup into the vulnerable Web page. Since the injected content does not carry directly executable script code, it is ignored by the current generation of XSS mitigations. However, during the web application lifetime, the site's script gadgets pick up the injected content and involuntarily transform its payload into executable code. Thus, script gadgets introduce the practice of code-reuse attacks [27] , comparable to return-to-libc, to the Web.
To explore the severity and prevalence of the underlying vulnerability pattern, we conduct a qualitative and quantitative study of script gadgets. For this, we rst identify the various gadget types, considering their functionality and their potential to undermine existing XSS mitigations. Furthermore, we examine 16 popular JavaScript frameworks and libraries, focusing on contained script gadgets and mapping the found gadget instances to the affected XSS mitigations. For instance, in 13 out of the 16 examined code-bases we found gadgets capable to circumvent the emerging strict-dynamic variant of the Content Security Policy [34] . Finally, we report on a large-scale empirical study on the prevalence of script gadgets in popular web sites.
By crawling the Alexa top 5000 Web sites and their rst-level links, we measured gadget-related data ows for approximately 650,000 individual crawled URLs. In total, we measured 4,352,491 sink executions with data retrieved from the DOM. Using our fullyautomated exploit generation framework, we generated exploits and veri ed gadgets on 19 .88% of all domains in the data set. As we applied a very conservative, but false-positive-free veri cation approach, we believe that this number is just a lower bound and that the numbers of gadgets are considerably higher in practice.
In particular, this paper makes the following contributions:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst researchers to systematically explore this new Web attack that allows to circumvent popular XSS mitigation techniques by abusing script gadgets. We describe the attack in detail and give a categorization of di erent types of gadgets.
• In order to explore script gadgets in detail, we present the results of a manual study on 16 modern JavaScript libraries.
Based on proof-of-concept exploits we demonstrate that almost all of these libraries contain gadgets. Furthermore, we demonstrate how these di erent script gadgets can be used to circumvent all 4 popular classes of mitigation techniques: The Content Security Policy, HTML sanitizers, Browser-based XSS lters and Web Application Firewalls.
• Based on the results of the manual study, we built a tool chain capable of automatically detecting and verifying gadgets at scale. Based on this tool, we conducted an empirical study of the Alexa top 5000 Web sites including more than 650k Web pages. The results of this study suggests that script gadgets are omnipresent in modern JavaScript-heavy applications. While our study is very conservative when measuring gadgets, we managed to detect and verify gadgets in 19 .88% of all domains. This number just represents a lower bound and is likely much higher in practice.
2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 2.1 JavaScript, HTML and the DOM Since its development, JavaScript has been used to interact with the DOM to make HTML documents more interactive. To do this, JavaScript working in the browser uses many di erent ways to read data from the DOM. Most of the corresponding functions such as document.getElementById or document.getElementsByClassName are based on DOM selectors [33] by providing convenient wrappers around document.querySelectorAll. DOM selectors are a powerful pattern language that can be used to query the DOM for certain elements, and therefore are the basis for all modern JavaScript frameworks. For example, one of the most famous JavaScript functions -jQuery's $ function -enhances the browser-based selector language with a lot of syntactic sugar. In the following table, we describe some selector features in detail:
Selector E.g. Matches...
Tag-based div div elements
Id-based #foo elements with id 'foo' Class-based .foo elements with class 'foo' Attr.-based [foo] elements with an attribute named 'foo'
Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
The term Cross-site Scripting (XSS) [29] describes a class of stringbased code injection vulnerabilities that let adversaries inject HTML and/or JavaScript into Web content that is not legitimately under their control. XSS vulnerabilities are generally categorized based on the location of the vulnerable source code, i.e., server-or client-side XSS, and the persistence of the injected attack code, i.e., re ected or stored XSS.
XSS can be avoided through secure coding practices, which mainly rely on the careful handling of attacker controlled input and context-aware sanitization/encoding of untrusted data before processing it in a security sensitive context. For brevity, we'll omit further details on the basic vulnerability class and refer to the vast body of existing work on the topic [7, 8, 17, 18, 21, 31 ].
XSS Mitigation Techniques
The basic XSS problem has been recognized since the beginning of the decade [5] , the root cause is understood, and a signi cant amount of work has been done to design approaches to detect and prevent XSS issues in source code. XSS is statistically still the most common vulnerability class however, and there seems to be no overall decline in its prevalence. It therefore seems safe to assume that XSS problems will not be solved completely with secure coding practices alone.
For this reason various XSS mitigations have been introduced as an important second line of defense. Instead of removing the underlying vulnerability, XSS mitigations aim to prevent the exploitation of the vulnerability by stopping the execution of the injected script code. XSS mitigations are widely implemented in four di erent forms:
(1) HTML Sanitizers. [34] . This is a browser feature that a web developer can con gure to de ne a policy that allows the browser to whitelist the JavaScript code that belongs to the application.
These mitigations all fundamentally rely one of three basic strategies:
(1) Request ltering blocks HTTP requests before they reach the application, working either at the browser level We will go into more details about the implementation of such strategies and the ways to bypass them in Section 4.
SCRIPT GADGETS
In this section, we introduce the concept of script gadgets, explaining how injecting a benign HTML markup may result in arbitrary JavaScript execution by reusing parts of legitimate application code and how this can be used to negate the e ects of XSS mitigations.
Benign HTML markup
XSS mitigation techniques described in Section 2.3 aim to stop XSS attacks by blocking execution of illegitimate, injected JavaScript code. Mitigations detect the injected code, present in inline event handlers or in separate script elements and prevent its execution, while legitimate JavaScript code, carrying appropriate trust information, is left as-is and is allowed to execute.
Those XSS mitigations ignore injected HTML markup that would not result in JavaScript execution -we'll call such markup benign HTML. Benign HTML does not contain <script> tags, inline event handlers, src or href attributes with javascript: or data: URLs, or other tags capable of JavaScript execution (<link rel=import>, <meta>, <style>). The following snippet is an example of benign HTML:
<div class= greeting > <b>Hello</b> world! </div> Listing 1: Benign HTML markup ignored by the mitigation
DOM selectors
The presence of benign HTML in a document does not directly trigger code execution. However, in virtually all web applications JavaScript code already present in the page interacts with the DOM, reading data from the document by using various DOM selectors (2.1). For example, a web application might take all elements with a tootltip attribute to decorate them by showing a given text when the user selects these elements. JavaScript code reading data from the DOM based on a selector is a common pattern in both user-land and library code -example code snippets might look like this: Listing 2: Reading data from the DOM By injecting benign HTML markup matching DOM selectors used in the application we are able to trigger the execution of speci c pieces of legitimate application code 6 -script gadgets.
Script Gadgets -Introduction
Script gadgets are fragments of legitimate JavaScript code belonging to the web application that execute as a result of benign HTML markup present in the web page. Script gadgets are not injected by the attacker -they are already present either in the user-land web application code, or one of the libraries/frameworks used by the web application.
Our research explores using script gadgets to bypass XSS mitigations. In order to do that, gadgets must both result in arbitrary script execution, and be triggered from benign HTML injection. For example, a web application might assign a value read from the DOM to the innerHTML property of an element: var button = getElementById( my-button ); button.innerHTML = button.getAttribute( data-text );
Listing 3: Simple innerHTML gadget
Simple gadgets like these are often explored in the context of DOM XSS vulnerabilities [16] , but for the purpose of this research we propose a new classi cation of gadgets of varying complexity. But rst we'll explain how to use script gadgets in attacks against XSS mitigations. 6 An alternative way of triggering speci c code paths in a web application from benign markup is DOM clobbering. DOM clobbering allows markup to override variables in JavaScript execution environment, making it possible to trigger speci c script behavior. While we have identi ed working bypasses of some XSS mitigations via DOM clobbering, for clarity we focus only on DOM selector-based code triggers.
Attack Outline
In this paper, we introduce a novel XSS attack that relies on script gadgets to cause the execution of the adversary's JavaScript code.
Attacker model: The applicable attacker is the classic XSS attacker [29] , who is able to inject arbitrary HTML code into the content of the attacked web document. In the context of this paper whether the injection technique used is re ected or stored XSS is irrelevant.
As discussed above, existing XSS mitigations rely on the basic assumption that malicious code is being directly injected into the a ected page in the course of an XSS attack. All non-script carrying, injected HTML content is therefore assumed to be benign and remains untouched by the mitigation. This assumption is exploited by the proposed attack method. The HTML code injected by the attacker exposes two characteristics:
(1) The actual attack payload, for example the attack's JavaScript, is contained in the benign HTML in a nonexecutable form. (2) The HTML is speci cally crafted so that its presence in the web document triggers a script gadget already contained in the web page's legitimate JavaScript code. In other words, the injected HTML payload triggers a code-reuse attack, similar to ret2libc techniques used in exploitation of memory-corruption vulnerabilities.
In the course of an attack, a script gadget accesses the injected DOM content and uses the contained information in an insecure manner, ultimately leading to the execution of the adversary's code, which was hidden in the benign HTML code. In summary, the class of attacks described in this paper follows this basic pattern:
(1) Injection into the raw HTML. The attacker controls the DOM of the webpage and injects a payload that triggers script gadgets in the application code. This payload contains only benign HTML markup and matches the DOM selectors used by the web application. (2) Mitigation attempt. An XSS mitigation inspects the injected content, trying to detect script insertion. The benign HTML markup is left as-is. (3) Gadgets transforms the markup. Gadgets present in the legitimate JavaScript code take the injected payload from the DOM using the DOM selectors and transform it into JavaScript statements. (4) Script executes. The transformed JavaScript statements are executed, resulting in XSS.
The precise ways to abuse gadgets to bypass XSS mitigations depend on the type of mitigation and implemented mitigation strategy, as we described in Section 2.3
Gadget Types
We identi ed several types of script gadgets useful in bypassing XSS mitigations. Some of them may result in indirect script execution on their own; others need to be combined in chains to be useful in an attack.
3.5.1 String manipulation gadgets. These gadgets transform their string input by using regular expressions, character replacement and other types of string manipulation. When present, they can be used to bypass mitigations based on pattern matching. For example, the following gadget can be used to bypass some mitigations by using the inner-h-t-m-l attribute name that will later on be used by Polymer framework to assign to element's innerHTML property. Listing 7: Example function creation gadgets 3.5.4 JavaScript execution sink gadgets. These gadgets are usually standalone, or are the last in the constructed gadget chain, taking the input from the previous gadgets and putting it into a DOM XSS [16] JavaScript execution sink.
eval(input); inputFunction.apply(); node.innerHTML = prefix + input + suffix ; jQuery.html(input); scriptElement.src = input; node.appendChild(input); Listing 8: Example execution sink gadgets 3.5.5 Gadgets in expression parsers. Some modern JavaScript frameworks (for example, Aurelia 7 , AngularJS 8 , Polymer 9 , Ractive.js 10 , Vue.js 11 ) interpret parts of the DOM tree as templates for the application UI components. Those templates contain expressions written in framework-speci c expression languages to bind a result of expression evaluation to a given position in the rendered UI. For example, the following expression displays a capitalized customer name: <td>${customer.name.capitalize()}</td>
Listing 9: Sample expression in Aurelia
The framework extracts the template de nition from the DOM, identi es embedded expressions by searching for appropriate code delimiters (here: ${ and }), parses the expressions into an AST, and evaluates them when the UI is rendered.
If the expression language syntax is expressive enough, attackers can create expressions resulting in arbitrary JavaScript code execution -for example by traversing a prototype chain or accessing object constructors [9] [10]. We found that various script gadgets can be typically identi ed in the framework expression parsing and evaluation engine which can lead to arbitrary code execution. For example, the following gadgets can be found in Aurelia's expression parser: 
Expressiveness of Gadget-based Exploits
In this section we discuss the expressiveness of gadget-based mitigation bypasses. Via gadgets, an attacker is able to execute arbitrary, Turing-complete code. In general, we identi ed three ways of doing so:
• Eval-like functions: If a gadget is able to trigger a call to eval or another eval-like function, executing arbitrary code is straightforward. In our examples, we usually demonstrate how the gadget is able to call a single function inside the window object with a single attacker-controlled parameter (e.g. alert (1)). As the eval function is also located inside the window object and accepts one or more parameters, all of these examples are capable of executing arbitrary, Turing-complete JavaScript code.
• Appending a script element: Another class of gadgets aims at appending a script element with either an attackercontrolled src attribute or an attacker-controlled script body. Similar to eval-based gadgets, this allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code.
• Abusing the expressiveness of an expression language: Most gadget-based mitigation bypasses leverage eval-like functions or new script elements. However, in Web applications employing some variants of CSP (see Section 4.1.1), it is not possible to use these bypass methods. In these cases, we can leverage expression languages to gain arbitrary code execution. All expression languages that we investigated are Turing-complete. If an exploit is able to execute the expression interpreter, the exploit is as expressive as the expression language itself. However, even if the expression language itself is not Turing-complete, we can still gain Turing-complete code execution in some cases. Listing 17, for example, shows a very simple expressionbased attack to steal and reuse a CSP nonce in order to add a seemingly trusted script, that allows us to achieve arbitrary JavaScript code execution.
Finding Script Gadgets
Script gadgets (3.3) on their own are legitimate, trusted JavaScript statements or code blocks. While some of them (3.5.4) are also DOM XSS [16] sinks, others are as benign as property assignment, or property traversal statements. This fact makes it particularly di cult to identify such gadgets in the web application codebase. We found the following two techniques are useful to identify script gadgets: 3.7.1 Manual code inspection. First of all, gadgets can be found manually or with the assistance of static-analysis tools. Finding some of the simpler gadget types (for example, JS execution sinks or Function creation gadgets) is straightforward. We found that more complex gadgets, especially the ones present in expression parsers, require signi cant e ort to locate and evaluate for usefulness. A gadget may only be used if it's reachable from a benign HTML markup injection. For example, any property access, property setter, or function call may potentially be useful in a chain, but only if the property name or function object may be directly controlled from the markup.
We found that manual code inspection makes it possible to nd gadgets that would not otherwise be triggered in the usual application code ow. For example, in Polymer 1.x (see Listing 12) we were able to determine that overriding a _rootDataHost property lets us execute JavaScript statements in a di erent scope, which lets us trigger subsequent gadgets in the chain. This "private" _rootDataHost property was never meant to be accessible from Polymer expressions.
In this research, we used manual code inspection to identify gadgets in modern JavaScript frameworks (4.1).
Taint tracking.
A subset of gadgets may be identi ed by rendering the web application in a browser enriched with a tainttracking engine [17] . By marking the entirety of DOM tree as tainted (i.e. simulating that the attacker has a re ected HTML injection capability), and checking whether tainted values reach speci c JavaScript execution sinks, we were able to identify ows linking certain DOM selectors with JavaScript execution. While this approach is e ective at scale, it has the limitation of only discovering gadgets that are already used in a given web application (albeit not neccesarily for script execution).
In this research, we used the taint tracking approach to evaluate script gadget prevalence in user-land code (5.4).
CONCRETE XSS MITIGATION BYPASSES USING SCRIPT GADGETS
In this section, we provide detailed information on how script gadgets can be leveraged to circumvent concrete state-of-the-art XSS mitigations. We'll follow the countermeasure classi cations, based on their underlying mechanisms, that we introduced in Section 2.3.
Gadgets in Popular JavaScript Libraries
In order to measure the e ectiveness of gadgets in bypassing XSS mitigations, we needed to collect:
(1) A list of XSS mitigation implementations with di erent strategies (2) A list of as many gadgets as possible in popular frameworks and libraries 4.1.1 Collecting a list of popular XSS mitigations. We selected XSS mitigations that were either open-source, or widely distributed. We also wanted a cross-section di erent mitigation implementation strategies. The mitigations we decided to test were:
• Content Security Policy using di erent types of code ltering: -Whitelist-based where code is trusted based on where it originates. -Nonce-based where code is trusted only if it's accompanied by a secret cryptographic nonce. -Unsafe-eval source expression is usually used together with other policies, but looking at it separately allows us to investigate eval-based gadgets. -Strict-dynamic source expression is usually used together with a nonce-based CSP to automatically propagate the trust of a nonced script to all script elements generated by it.
• Client-side HTML sanitizers using di erent approaches of sanitization: -DOMPurify is a JavaScript-based HTML sanitizer that supports HTML, SVG, MathML, among others. Firewall, commonly used with the OWASP Core Rule Set.
• XSS lters employ either request lter, response sanitization or code ltering approaches.
-Chrome / Safari employs a code ltering approach, blacklisting scripts that appear in the request. -Internet Explorer / Edge employs a response sanitization approach, rewriting potentially dangerous responses with something safe. -NoScript employs a request ltering approach, blocking requests that look suspicious or potentially malicious.
Collecting a list of popular JavaScript libraries.
In order to nd as many di erent gadgets as possible to test against mitigations, we decided to search for gadgets in di erent popular JavaScript frameworks and libraries. We obtained the lists of popular frameworks and libraries from various online resources 12 13 14 15 16 . From those lists, we focused on searching for gadgets in the following frameworks (selected based on popularity and code familiarity by the authors):
• Trending JavaScript frameworks (Vue.js, Aurelia, Polymer) • Widely popular frameworks (AngularJS, React, EmberJS) • Older still popular frameworks (Backbone, Knockout, Ractive, Dojo) • Libraries and compilers (Bootstrap, Closure, RequireJS) • jQuery-based libraries (jQuery, jQuery UI, jQuery Mobile)
The process we used for manually identifying gadgets is described in Section 3.7.1, but generally it was done by identifying HTML and eval-based sinks, as well as any documented feature that seemed like an expression language. In cases when no sinks of that form were reachable, we then looked for any mechanism exposed by the framework or library that touched the DOM in any way, and manually audited the code.
In Table 1 we summarize how many frameworks had gadgets that could bypass each of the mitigations. Complete bypass collection found during this analysis is available in the GitHub repository 17 . 12 Mustache Security is a list of frameworks with gadgets. https://github.com/cure53/mustache-security/tree/master/wiki 13 GitHub contains a list of trending front-end JavaScript frameworks. https://github.com/showcases/front-end-javascript-frameworks 14 TodoMVC is a list of a sample application written in many di erent JavaScript frameworks. http://todomvc.com/ 15 JS.org Rising Stars 2016 is based on the activity on di erent GitHub projects related to JavaScript frameworks in 2016. https://risingstars2016.js.org/ 16 State of JS 2016 is based on a survey to web developers. http://stateofjs.com/2016/frontend/ 17 https://github.com/google/security-research-pocs Table 2 within the Appendix also summarizes our research ndings. For clarity, in the following sections we present and discuss only a chosen selection of those bypasses.
Bypassing Request Filtering Mitigations
Request ltering mitigations attempt to identify malicious or untrusted HTML patterns, and stop them before they reach the application. To accomplish this, these mitigations generally employ the following approaches:
• Enumerate known strings used in attacks. For example, HTML tags like <script> or attributes such as onerror allow the user to execute JavaScript with a single HTML injection. The ModSecurity Core Rule Set version 3.0 is, at the time of writing, one of the most comprehensive lists of attack vectors.
• Detect characters used to escape from the contexts where XSS vulnerabilities usually occur. For example, if an XSS vulnerability existed by directly injecting HTML where the application expected to just output text, a request ltering mitigation will attempt to detect the injection of < or >. If the vulnerability is present when injecting inside an HTML attribute, escaping from the attribute would be detected as the vulnerability.
• Detect patterns and sequences frequently used in exploits. For example, when an XSS attack is succesful, the user will often attempt to steal credentials, or issue HTTP requests. Therefore, some mitigations attempt to detect access to document.cookie, or access to XMLHTTPRequest. They also attempt to detect usual mechanisms to obfuscate code execution, like references to eval or innerHTML, even after doing several layers of agressive decoding.
Examples of XSS mitigations that adopt these approaches are:
Request ltering mitigations detect only speci c, XSS-related HTML tags and attributes. Gadgets use HTML tags and attributes that are considered benign, and that makes them capable of bypassing such mitigations. For example, if a library takes the value of the data-html attribute and executes it as HTML, mitigations in this group would not be able to detect that as malicious. An example of HTML markup triggering such gadget chain was shown in Listing 11.
In addition, detection of context-breaking characters suddenly becomes ine ective because some gadgets change the meaning of otherwise-safe text sequences, and make them dangerous. For example, in AngularJS the use of two curly braces {{ is a way to de ne the beginning of an AngularJS expression. Aurelia, in turn, uses a di erent delimiter: ${. An example of such seemingly-benign markup was shown in Listing 9. A good example of how to bypass request ltering mitigations like NoScript with gadgets is presented in Listing 13. In this example the expressiveness of the framework is used to split an exploit such as location.href=name (which is detected as an attack by NoScript as the global name property can generally be set by an attacker to arbitrary content), into two components. a=location followed by a.href=name. Individually, these expressions are harmless, but together they allow the user to redirect the user to a JavaScript URL speci ed in the name attribute. NoScript is not able to parse the markup to gure out that they are both meant to be executed together.
Bypassing Response Sanitization Mitigations
Response sanitization mitigations are designed to reduce the number of false positive results that are potentially generated by request ltering. Instead of blocking potentially malicious requests, response sanitization mitigations aim to detect whether a suspicious payload actually gets injected into the response.
Response sanitization mitigations usually follow one of two di erent techniques:
• Remove or neuter the malicious attack. One possible way to tackle the potential injection of code is to neuter it, or remove it from the HTTP response. In this approach, the rest of the response is left as-is, but the suspicious code is removed or made inert.
• Block the response completely. Another possible way to react to an injection attempt is to completely block the response, and display an error to the user. This approach avoids cases in which an attacker tricks a mitigation technique into blocking a legitimate script (e.g. a frame buster). Examples of implementations of XSS mitigations that adopt these types of approaches are:
• HTML sanitizers. Most HTML sanitizers work by taking a piece of HTML code and cleaning it of any malicious input, and returning otherwise safe HTML. Most HTML sanitizers, however, are based on whitelists that try to enumerate safe HTML tags and attributes across all browsers.
• Internet Explorer / Edge XSS lter. The XSS lter in Microsoft Internet Explorer and Edge also sanitizes HTML by replacing parts of HTML attributes and tag names with a pound # symbol. Note that while HTML sanitizers use whitelists, XSS lters on the other hand work on a blacklisting approach, enumerating dangerous HTML tags and attributes known by the browser. Bypassing HTML sanitizers usually requires a slightly di erent approach than bypassing XSS lters. For HTML sanitizers, the gadgets must reuse an otherwise safe and whitelisted attribute, such as class or id. Gadgets that bypass XSS lters can also use custom HTML tags and attributes such as ng-click in Angular or v-html in Vue.
Given that mitigations based on response sanitization only block vulnerabilities, but make no attempts at detecting artifacts of exploits, this makes them easier to bypass, since gadgets are by denition "safe" code that becomes unsafe when it interacts with other JavaScript code that is otherwise safe. Aiming to lower the false positive rate by using response sanitization has the downside of not being able to detect attacks that exploit features that are normally safe when the JavaScript library is not used.
<div data-role=popup id= --> &lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt; > </div>
Listing 14: Example of bypassing DOMPurify with jQuery Mobile gadget
An example on how to use gadgets to bypass response sanitization mitigations is presented in listing 14. As far as DOMPurify is aware, the HTML it sanitized is completely safe. However, jQuery Mobile, upon encountering an element with the attribute data-role=popup, will automatically try to inject an HTML comment with its id. In the code above, we can escape from that comment and execute our code. Note that the same attack works against Internet Explorer's XSS lter.
Bypassing Code Filtering Mitigations
Code ltering mitigations are an evolution on top of response sanitization. They attempt to leave the potentially malicious markup untouched, and instead focus on preventing the execution of malicious code. This approach has even lower false positive rate than sanitization, since the code is ltered out only if it's actually about to be executed.
However, one side-e ect of such an approach is that since gadgets do not directly execute any malicious code, but do so indirectly through trusted code, it is a lot harder for XSS mitigations based on code ltering to detect injections using gadgets.
The approaches taken by XSS mitigations based on code ltering are:
• Detect malicious code. To detect whether a speci c piece of code is malicious, it is checked against the HTTP request.
If the code to be executed is also present in the request, it is blocked as not trustworthy and potentially attackercontrolled.
• Detect benign code. Benign code passes various policy checks based on code provenance, content, or generation method. Code violating the policy requirements is considered malicious and its execution is blocked.
Examples of implementations of XSS mitigations that adopt this approach are:
• Chrome and Safari's XSS Auditor. The latest XSS lter to be implemented in a major browser was Chrome and Safari's XSS Auditor. The XSS Auditor hooks into JavaScript runtime in the browser. XSS Auditor uses the 'detect malicious code' approach -before Auditor permits code execution, it validates that the code was not included in the HTTP request, and blocks it if it was.
• Content Security Policy. Content Security Policy [34] is the most popular example of code-ltering mitigation. Web applications using this mitigation de ne a policy that speci es which scripts are benign and should be allowed to execute. Scripts violating the policy are blocked by the supporting browser. Existing policies usually adopt one the ltering variants described in Section 4.1.1. A typical policy is either URL whitelist-based or nonce/hash-based. A policy may also use strict-dynamic and/or unsafe-eval source expressions. These keywords propagate trust to additional code created by already trusted scripts, making CSP easier to adopt on existing websites.
Code ltering mitigations hook on code execution and aim to assure only legitimate code gets executed. Since script gadgets are already part of a legitimate code base they are extremely useful in bypassing this mitigation group. In the analysis performed against popular frameworks and libraries in section 4.1, we found that code ltering mitigations are the ones most vulnerable to gadgets. We used element construction gadgets (3.5.2), JavaScript execution sink gadgets (3.5.4) and gadgets in expression parsers (3.5.5) to bypass code ltering mitigations. While we found that expression-parserbased gadgets were the most universally applicable, some bypass methods employed were mitigation-variant speci c:
Bypassing XSS Auditor. We bypassed XSS Auditor in 13 out of 16 frameworks, as many gadgets use traditional DOM XSS [16] sinks, DOM XSS protection being a known shortcoming of XSS Auditor [32] . For example, a gadget in the Dojo framework calls an eval function, with the value extracted from the data-dojo-props attribute. This allowed us to create the following bypass:
Listing 15: Example of bypassing XSS Auditor with Dojo gadget
Bypassing unsafe-eval CSP. In order to bypass CSP with an unsafe-eval keyword we either used gadgets in expression parsers or gadgets calling an eval-like function. Listing 15 demonstrates a bypass using such gadget. We were able to circumvent policies using unsafe-eval in 10 out of 16 frameworks.
Bypassing strict-dynamic CSP. Adding a strict-dynamic keyword to the CSP enables already trusted code to programmatically create new script elements. When such scripts are introduced into the DOM, they are implicitly trusted and allowed to execute.
We found that most analyzed JavaScript frameworks contain gadgets capable of creating and inserting script elements with controlled body or src attribute. Such gadgets can be used to bypass strict-dynamic CSP. As an example, we present the bypass found in RequireJS:
<script data-main= data:1,alert(1) ></script> Listing 16: Example of bypassing strict-dynamic with RequireJS gadget
Since the <script> tag has a data-main attribute, a gadget in RequireJS will generate a new script element, with its source pointing to data:,alert(1). As RequireJS is already trusted, strict-dynamic propagates this trust to the new element, and the code will execute, bypassing the page's Content Security Policy.
We found strict-dynamic bypasses in 13 out of 16 tested frameworks (two of the bypasses relied on co-presence of unsafe-eval). The prevalence of script gadgets in the tested JavaScript frameworks suggests that using the strict-dynamic variant of CSP to mitigate XSS vulnerabilities in modern web applications is less e ective than previously thought [35] .
Bypassing other CSP variants. Both aforementioned CSP keywords relax the restrictions of the policy in order to facilitate its adoption. Some websites opt to use a stronger version of CSP, e.g. relying solely on nonces, or using a whitelist of script source URLs, with no known bypasses in the list of allowed origins [35] . We found that even such variants of Content Security Policy can be bypassed using script gadgets in expression parsers (3.5.5). In some frameworks, expression parsers themselves create a runtime environment that allows the attacker to obtain a window object reference and call arbitrary JavaScript functions. Such vectors do not use eval and do not create new script elements, so Content Security Policy cannot detect and block them. Listings 11 and 12 present examples for this type of bypasses. Such gadgets were found in Aurelia, Vue.js and Polymer 1.x. Additionally, in Ractive we found a gadget capable of ex ltrating the CSP nonce into a newly created script, allowing for its execution, despite a strong, only nonce-based policy:
<script id= template type= text/ractive > <iframe srcdoc= <script nonce={{@global.document.currentScript.nonce}}> alert(document.domain) </{{}}script> > </iframe> </script>
Listing 17: Bypass ex ltrating CSP nonce in Ractive
It's worth noting that the success of CSP mitigation depends on the used variant. If the policy is con gured to use whitelists, hashes, or nonces alone, then only gadgets in expression parsers (3.5.5) are useful, as the code passed to JavaScript execution sinks (3.5.4) would not be trusted. A notable exception is strict-dynamic, which propagates trust to <script> tags generated programmatically. Attackers may bypass such CSP with gadgets generating arbitrary HTML elements, or importing nodes from foreign DOM documents. Such gadgets are common in templating libraries.
As we have presented above, the gadgets used to bypass di erent mitigations vary signi cantly from mitigation to mitigation. Some abuse the expression language in libraries, others inject markup in a text attribute, while others abuse trust propagation in DOM element creation. This indicates which type of gadgets to search for to bypass di erent types of mitigations.
PREVALENCE OF SCRIPT GADGETS
In this section we present the results of an empirical study on the prevalence of script gadgets in real-world applications. We rst present our research questions and methodology, then discuss the results.
Research Statement
As shown above, script gadgets have the potential to undermine the protections provided by XSS mitigations. While we manually discovered many of these gadgets in popular libraries, it is important to understand the prevalence of these code patterns at scale. If gadgets are rare in real-world code, we can address the problem by taking special care when building generic libraries. If script gadgets are wide-spread in real-world applications however, addressing this problem might be as hard as xing XSS itself. Therefore, the goal of this study is to measure the prevalence of gadgets in real-world applications.
After measuring gadget pervasiveness, we aim to nd out more about the impact of script gadgets on speci c XSS mitigations. Speci cally, we would like to focus on the Content Security Policy and HTML sanitizers as these mitigation techniques seem to be the most robust and relevant ones.
A previous study [35] has already demonstrated that the domain whitelisting and the 'unsafe-inline' CSP source expression harm the protection capabilities of CSP. In this study, we'd like to investigate the 'unsafe-eval' and 'strict-dynamic' source expressions. Speci cally, we want to investigate how prevalent script gadgets are that can potentially bypass these expressions.
Many sanitizers, by default, allow seemingly benign attributes such as data-*, id or class. Furthermore, sanitizers usually allow non-malicious tags such as div or span tags. Hence, we'd like to understand how many real-world gadget chains can be triggered from such tags and attributes.
Methodology
In order to detect gadgets in real-world applications, we built a toolchain to automatically detect and verify them at scale. Based on this toolchain, we crawled the Alexa Top 5000 Web sites.
Detecting Gadgets at Scale. As we did not expect to see many expression parsers (see 3.5.5) present in user-land code (assuming that expression parsers are mostly present in JavaScript frameworks), we decided to focus on gadgets that end in HTML, JavaScript or URL execution sinks (see 3.5.4). In order to detect such potential gadgets, we built a browser-based, dynamic taint tracking engine. The engine is capable of reporting data ows from DOM nodes into security sensitive functions such as eval, innerHTML, document.write, or XMLHttpRequest.open() 18 . We used this engine to crawl our data set and identify all data ows. Each of these ows represents a potentially exploitable gadget chain.
Verifying Gadgets. In order to verify whether a found ow is exploitable from benign HTML markup, we built a generator that is capable of creating a real-world exploit based on each ow. The generator is similar to the one presented in [17] . Subsequently, we simulate a re ected XSS vulnerability in the page, into which we inject the generated exploit. The goal of the exploit is to indirectly execute a JavaScript function from a source that would not usually execute such code (e.g. from a data-attribute). Listing 18 shows an exemplary gadget that might exist in a legitimate JavaScript le. <div id= button data-text= &lt;svg onload=verify()&gt; > </div>
Listing 20: Final Exploit
This lets us build the exploits in a way that our veri er function does not trigger by default. This function is called only if a script gadget reads the payload from benign markup and executes it. Therefore, if the function gets called, we have veri ed the gadget in a false-positive-free way.
Crawling The Data Set. Our initial seed data set consists of the Alexa Top 5000 Web sites. We crawled these pages and also visited all the http: and https: links from these pages that point to the same domain or a subdomain. This approach might bias the data set, since Web pages with more links on the start pages will be over-represented in the nal data set. The same is true for subdomains: Some Web sites make excessive use of subdomains, while others are not using them at all. Because of this, we decided to deduplicate our nal results based on the rst domain before the top level domain (subsequently called "second level domains"). E.g. we merge results from sub.example.co.uk, example.co.uk and foo.example.co.uk and just regard all of these domains as belonging to example.co.uk. We are aware that this approach has a signi cant impact on the nal results, but we think that this provides the most realistic view on the data.
Limitations
Our testing and veri cation approach has the following limitations:
Only rst level links: We only followed the rst-level of links, so our data set does not cover all the pages of a site.
No user interaction: Our crawlers do not interact with the page. This means that we are only able to nd gadgets in code that get executed at page load by default.
No authentication: Our crawlers do not authenticate to the pages under test. Consequently, we might have missed results in authenticated parts of an application, signi cantly reducing the potential coverage of crawled web applications.
Veri cation does not focus on mitigation bypasses: In the study, we do not arti cially add, modify or remove any speci c XSS mitigation to crawled websites. We only verify that a data ow from a non-executing source is capable of executing arbitrary code in a page via a gadget, even in the presence of a given mitigation. The reason for this is that some mitigations cannot be easily applied to Web sites. For example, applying a Web Application Firewall or Content Security Policy (see 2.3) to a page requires a non-trivial amount of con guration, and is likely to break the functionality when done automatically. Furthermore, exploits need to be adopted to the speci c mitigation techniques. Hence, by focusing on the mere code execution aspect, we can verify gadgets more e ciently.
Our XSS simulation approach is false-negative-prone: In a real-world mitigation setting, the initial XSS attack should be blocked by stopping the execution of the injected code. However, even when the original injection was stopped, a gadget can still potentially execute the injected content, e ectively bypassing the mitigation. For example, while script elements are initially blocked by CSP, they remain in the DOM and gadgets may reintroduce them, triggering them again. While this would be a valid mitigationspeci c bypass, this payload would execute directly without triggering any gadget when a CSP is not present. In order to avoid such false-positive ndings, we only generate exploits that do not trigger JavaScript execution by default. For example, we did not inject gadgets in the following form: <div id= foo ><script>verify()</script></div>
Listing 21: Invalid Exploit
Instead, we transform the payload into a form that cannot execute by default, by using the xmp plaintext tag, for example:
<xmp id= foo ><script>verify()</script></xmp>
Listing 22: Non-executing Exploit
While this approach completely removes false positives from our results, it might cause a considerable number of false negatives. For example, often the name of a tag is part of the DOM selector trigerring the gadget. Hence, by changing the tag name (in the example: from div to xmp), the exploit might not be able to trigger the gadget correctly. E ectively we lowered our veri cation rate and in turn signi cantly increased the quality of our results.
Limitation Summary. All these limitations should be taken into account when reading the following sections. Most importantly, we want to point out that the presented results are lower bounds. If deep crawling, user interaction and a less restrictive veri cation are applied, the resulting numbers will likely be higher.
Results
This section is divided into several subsections. After reporting on general crawling results, we present numbers and statistics about the detected data ows. Then we report on the results of our automatic gadget veri cation, and nally we discuss the results in the context of XSS mitigation techniques.
Crawling Results.
As mentioned above, our initial data set consisted of the Alexa top 5000 Web sites. By following the rstlevel links, we crawled 647,085 Web pages on the same domains or subdomains of this set, which nally contained 37,232 di erent sub domains and 4,557 second-level-domains. The number of secondlevel domains is lower than 5000, because some entries in the Alexa Top Sites le redirect to the same domain based on geo location. For example, google.it, google.de, google.fr all redirect to google.com. Furthermore, some Web sites were not reachable or timed out while crawling. In some cases, this is due to sites that only use regional CDNs. For example, a site from Asia might be fast in Asia but very slow when requested from the US or Europe. For all the remaining pages, we collected data ows using our taint engine.
Taint
Results. On average we measured 7.67 sink calls per crawled URL and around 450 sink calls aggregated per second-level domain. In total, we counted 4,352,491 sink calls with data resulting from 4,889,568 unique sources within the DOM. Grouped by second-level domain, sink and source, we measured 22,379 unique combinations.
Mitigation results.
In the following, we want to relate these results to the XSS mitigations, especially CSP 'unsafe-eval', CSP 'strict-dynamic' and HTML sanitizers.
Content Security Policy -'unsafe-eval': As opposed to the 'unsafeinline' keyword, unsafe-eval in the past seemed to be more secure in general. While unsafe-inline almost completely removes the protection capabilities of a CSP policy, unsafe-eval by default does not make the policy bypass-able. In order to bypass the policy with unsafe-eval an attacker needs to nd an injection into a JavaScript execution function (eval, new Function, setTimeout, setInterval, etc.). Finding a direct injection is often hard and time consuming, because the use of such function is limited and can be easily audited by the application owner. Hence 'unsafe-eval' was seen as an acceptable trade-o between security and usability of CSP. However, the results of our study imply that this long-held belief should be changed. Gadgets can be used as an indirect way of reaching an execution sink. If DOM content gets evaluated by default, the attacker can inject the code as a DOM node in order to abuse the eval-gadget to execute arbitrary code. In our data set 47.76% of all second-level domains contained a data ow that ended within a JavaScript execution function. During our crawl, for example, we unintentionally automatically bypassed Tumblr's CSP policy with a gadget bypassing its unsafe-eval source expression.
Content Security Policy -'strict-dynamic': The strict-dynamic source expression was added to CSP to increase the usability of nonce-based policies. As described in 4.1.1, strict-dynamic enables automatic trust propagation to child scripts. If a nonced, and thus legitimate, script appends a child script element to the DOM, the child script would be blocked unless the parent script propagates the nonce to the script as well. As many libraries are not aware of CSP, these libraries do not propagate the nonce and thus CSP would block the child script and break the library's functionality. When strict-dynamic is enabled trust is automatically propagated to non-parser-inserted script elements. Consequently, under strict-dynamic, child script elements are automatically executed even if they do not carry a nonce. In this situation, attackers may use gadgets to bypass CSP. If DOM content gets injected into a script element, or into a library function (e.g. jQuery.html) that creates and appends new script elements, strict-dynamic CSP can be bypassed. In order to measure potentially a ected Web sites, we counted the following data ows:
• The data ows ending within text, textContent or innerHTML of a script tag • The data ow ending within text, textContent or innerHTML of a tag, where the tag name is DOM-controlled (tainted) • The data ow ending within script.src • The data ow ending in a API which is known for creating and appending script tags to the DOM. In total, 73.03% of all second-level domains contained at least one data ow with the described characteristics. For example, we detected a gadget capable of bypassing strict-dynamic in Facebook's fbevents.js library 19 .
Content Security Policy -Summary. Given the numbers and examples provided above, we believe that unsafe-eval and strict-dynamic considerably weaken a CSP policy. Great care should be taken when using these source expressions. 19 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/ads-for-websites/pixel-events/v2.9 HTML Sanitizers: Sanitizers aim at removing potentially malicious content. Most sanitizers do this by de ning a known-good list of tags and attributes and removing anything else from a provided string. This list varies from sanitizer to sanitizer. The Closure sanitizer for example, removes data-attributes, while DOMPurify allows them in its default con guration. Furthermore, all sanitizers we looked at allow id and class attributes. Hence, we investigated whether this behavior is secure. In our data set 78.30% of all secondlevel domains had at least one data ow from an HTML attribute into a security-sensitive sink, whereas 59.51% of the sites exhibited such ows from data-attributes. Furthermore, 15.67% executed data from id attributes and 10% from class attributes. Based on these numbers, we recommend to revisit at least the sanitization approach towards blocking data-attributes.
Gadget Results.
Based on the identi ed data ows, we generated 1,762,823 gadget-based exploit candidates, based on which we validated 285,894 gadgets on 906 (19.88%) of all second-level domains.
SUMMARY & DISCUSSION
Our study has demonstrated that data ows from the DOM into security-sensitive functions are very frequent in modern applications and frameworks. In fact, 81.85% of all second-level domains exhibited at least one relevant data ow. Furthermore, we have shown that we can detect these ows and generate exploits that are capable of bypassing all modern XSS mitigations. In a fully automated fashion, we detected and veri ed gadgets on 19.88% of all second-level domains. However, due to our methodology, we believe that this is just a lower bound for the real extent of this problem. By applying deeper crawling, authentication, user interaction and less conservative testing approach the numbers would doubtlessly increase considerably. We speci cally removed or changed all exploits that would result in an immediate execution at the initial injection.
Given these results, we believe that XSS mitigations in their current form are not well aligned with modern applications, frameworks and vulnerabilities. In general, we see three di erent ways to address the issue of script gadgets:
Fix the Mitigation Techniques
Making mitigation techniques gadget-aware in general is hard. Today there are so many expression languages, frameworks, libraries and instances of user-land code that it will be very di cult to address all of the di erent types of gadgets. For example, request ltering mitigations (4.2) will have a hard time in detecting all the various forms that script gadgets can take, especially when the gadget chain makes use of string transformation functions. However, we believe that a few of the vectors can be addressed by speci c mitigations. HTML sanitizers, for example, could start to lter data-, id or class attributes.
Fix the Applications
Another approach to address the identi ed problems is to try to x the applications. Popular libraries and frameworks, for example, could aim at removing gadgets in order to safeguard their users.
Given the extent of the problem however, we will likely not be able to address this problem at scale.
As some gadgets and gadget chains are part of the feature set of a framework, it is unlikely that developers of such frameworks are willing to remove or restrict these features for preventing XSS mitigation bypasses. Furthermore, we found a number of unintentional gadgets; code paths that were triggered through gadgets that were not intended by their developers. These unintended code paths are hard to nd, sometimes even harder than a simple XSS vulnerability. As a result, we believe that xing XSS mitigations and script gadgets might be as hard and time consuming as xing the XSS problem itself.
Shift from Mitigation to Isolation and Prevention techniques
Due to the results of our study, we believe that the focus of Web Security engineers should shift from mitigation techniques towards isolation and prevention techniques. Sandboxed Iframes [13] , Suborigins [36] or Isolated Scripts [22] are promising proposals for Isolation techniques. Furthermore, the Web needs to focus on XSS prevention techniques: The Web platform is inherently insecure. A novice programmer without much security knowledge is hardly able to create a secure Web application. The Web platform should let a developer easily create a secure app by providing secure-bydefault APIs. Language-based security concepts, for example, could be added to the Web platform, so that it is impossible to introduce security vulnerabilities without malicious intent.
RELATED WORK
Client-side XSS:. While the source of the initial content injection can be caused by all classes of XSS, gadget-based attacks are rooted in insecure client-side data ows caused by JavaScript. Thus, the closest related class of vulnerabilities is client-side XSS, also known as DOM-based XSS. The rst public documentation of this vulnerability class was done by Amit Klein in 2005 [16] . In 2013 Lekies et al. [17] conducted a large scale study that demonstrated the prevalence of this XSS type, showing that approximately 10% of the examined web sites exposed at least one client-side XSS problem. To address this problem, Stock et al. [32] proposed a taint tracking-based protection mechanism to stop insecure data-ows within the web browser. While taint tracking could potentially detect or stop gadget-based attacks, this paper only covers client-side data ows. Most of our exploits, however, have hybrid data ows that span across the client and the server. Hence, in its current version Stock et al. 's approach cannot stop our attacks. More recently, Parameshwaran et al. [26] advanced this defense via server-side instrumentation of the JavaScript code, thus eliminating the need of browser modi cations. It is unclear to which degree these taintbased techniques can be adapted to address script gadget attacks, as the initial payload does not come from a untrusted source, and thus, are not easily distinguishable from the legitimate targets of the gadget code.
The potential security problems of insecure JavaScript transforming DOM content was initially documented by Heiderich et al. in two distinct variations. In the rst, they showed how JavaScript frameworks like AngularJS create insecure injection vulnerabilities which are out-of-scope for classic server-side XSS sanitization techniques, due to custom client-side markup conventions [10] . Furthermore, they uncovered how speci c, non-standard browser behavior potentially transformed initially secure DOM content into executable code, if read and rewritten via JavaScript [12] . Athanasopoulos et al. [2] described return-to-JavaScript, a similar attack scenario circumventing mitigations based on script whitelists. In their attack, the attacker executes already whitelisted scripts in an unwanted fashion. The basic assumption of their attack is that an XSS exists in the application and the attacker is only able to execute already whitelisted scripts. Under these assumptions the attacker could try to repurpose whitelisted scripts. For example, if there is a button with a whitelisted event handler that logs out the user, the attacker could reuse the whitelisted event handler and attach it to an onload event via the XSS vulnerability. In this way users would be logged out immediately once they visit the application. While the mitigation prevents general exploitation, the attacker could still harm the user experience considerably by abusing the existing scripts.
Circumventing XSS mitigations:
The topic of undermining the protective capabilities of XSS mitigations has been explored previously as well. Zalewski [37] outlined potential future direction of mitigation combating in his in uential essay "Postcards from the post-XSS world", touching many emerging techniques, such as content in ltration, whitelist abuse, or potential possibilities for Web code reuse attacks.
On the topic of browser-based XSS mitigations, Nava and Lindsay [23] and Bates et al. [3] exposed inherent weaknesses in XSS mitigation approaches that rely on regular expression based detection mechanism. These results directly motivated the design of the XSSAuditor [3] . In turn, Stock et al. [32] demonstrated the weakness of all string-based XSS lters in non-trivial vulnerability scenarios, such as partial or double injections.
In addition to research on client-side XSS lters, Content Security Policy was subject of several research endeavors. For one, in concurrent work Weichselbaum et al [35] and Calzavara et al. [4] examined the quality and e ectiveness of currently deployed CSP policies with sobering results. In addition, Weichselbaum et al. [35] demonstrated how whitelist-based policies can be easily evaded using overly permissive whitelisted script providers. In complementary work, Chen et al. [6] and Van Acker et al. [1] presented various techniques to evade CSP's information ow restrictions. Furthermore, Pan et al [25] investigated how to automatically generate secure CSP policies (without the unsafe-inline or unsafe-eval keywords). While these policies could resist simple gadgets, such strong policies are still vulnerable to expression-based gadgets as outlined in section 4.4. Finally, Heiderich et al. [11] demonstrated how injected HTML and CSS code alone is su cient to conduct a wide range of attacks, even when a comprehensive CSP for script execution prevention is in place.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we comprehensively explored code-reuse attacks in Web pages using script gadgets. Script gadgets come in many variations and, as our empirical study uncovered, are omnipresent in modern Web code.
As we have demonstrated, the current generation of XSS mitigations is unable to handle XSS attacks that leverage script gadgets to execute their payloads. And, unfortunately, there is no linear upgrade path to adapt the current mitigation approaches to robustly handle the uncovered vulnerability pattern. While speci c mitigation techniques can be modi ed to handle selected gadget types, the high variance of script gadget form and functionality, due to the vastly growing amount of custom client-side code and the constant ow of new client-side frameworks, prevents a comprehensive adaption to accommodate the problem.
This leads to a conundrum for the future of client-side Web security: The last 15 years of di culty in addressing XSS have shown that XSS apparently cannot be thoroughly addressed in practice through secure coding practices alone. And the subject of this paper, especially in combination with complementary results [9, 32] , suggest that the current approaches in XSS mitigation are insu cient to compensate the de cits of code-based XSS prevention.
The question then arises: how do we handle XSS on the road ahead? As discussed above, sophisticated isolation techniques could o er a third way of dealing with the potential consequences of attacker controlled JavaScript. Alternatively, safe code abstractions [15] and secure-by-default browser APIs [20] might also be an option to overcome today's inherent problems of ad-hoc, insecure Web content generation.
However, regardless of which paradigm the next generation of XSS countermeasures will be build upon, it is essential that they have to be capable to handle the unexpected client-side executionand data-ows which may be caused by legitimate script gadgets.
